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Abstract 
 
The Chinese economy has been growing with a pace and duration that the world has 
never seen before. Since 1978, the country has been facing a constant economic growth 
for more than 30 years. One of the pillars of the economy is the automotive industry; an 
interesting mixture of Joint Ventures and independent companies. The competition is cut 
throat and has even been more intense after the China’s World Trade Organization 
accession in 2001. The potential of the industry is huge, taken into consideration the size 
of the market and the impressive growth of the economy. All the above leave no doubt: 
the WTO accession in 2001 was a very important evolution that could trigger many 
changes in the country’s industry and potentially give the Chinese auto manufacturers the 
chance to go global and compete in Western, more prestigious markets but in the same 
time caused serious concern about the possible threats that it could cause. 
 
The questions this paper will try to answer are two. Has the WTO had a positive effect on 
the Chinese auto industry, and if so, and more importantly, how has it? In addition, the 
question of the times concerning the auto industry; can the Chinese compete abroad? Can 
they follow the example followed by the Japanese and the Koreans and become real 
global players and if so how long should the world wait for the fourth big one? 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTORY NOTES 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In the past, the Big Three in the automotive industry referred to the three biggest 
American companies, Ford, General Motors and Chrysler. These companies were by far 
the biggest in the world and dominated the industry and the global market. After the 
Japanese “invasion” in the field in the 1960s and 70s, the German industry’s 
reincarnation after the World War II and the effects of this new era of globalization the 
term now refers to the three biggest automobile industries of the USA, Germany and 
Japan. However, it seems that we are entering a new period that the Big Three will 
actually become the “Big Four”, since China is emerging as a key player in the field with 
huge potential abilities and a domestic market that at least size wise can be bigger than 
the “Big Three” combined. 
 
Ever since the reforms started in 1978 the Chinese economy has been growing with very 
impressive rates. It has become one of the biggest economies in the world and it seems 
that it is only a matter of time to converge with the more advanced economies of the 
Western world as well as Japan. Many researchers and scholars believe that by 2030 the 
Chinese economy will be as big as the American one. A very interesting industry that is 
particularly important for the country’s growth is the Automotive Industry. With very big 
levels of production of vehicles and huge potential due to the size of the Chinese market, 
as well as the potential in going global, is an industry that is expected by many to take the 
lead in the world market in the not very distant future, possibly much sooner that many 
would expect just a few years ago. However, it is still at a stage that poses no threat to the 
Western and Japanese car manufacturers, since it is still lagging behind in innovation 
abilities and quality, as well as after market services. The question that now many 
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researchers have is not whether, but when, Chinese automotive manufacturers will be 
able to follow the Japanese and Korean examples and become global players, competitive 
in a global environment and whether the evolution of the Chinese automotive industry 
can be helpful in estimating whether there is something in common with the Japanese one 
a few decades ago. 
 
A very controversial subject dealing with the Chinese automotive industry was the 
country’s accession to the World Trade Organization. After a process that lasted for 
almost two decades the country was finally admitted in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in September of 2001.  After the accession, China was deprived of its most 
important tools that it had been using to protect the domestic industries, including the 
automobile one, before entering the WTO. The government was no longer allowed to use 
the protectionism measures that it used in the past in order to protect and promote its auto 
industry, such as high tariffs, performance requirements and numerical quotas. Many 
experts believed that WTO accession would cause serious problems to the automotive 
industry since the opening of the economy would cause a flood of imports that would 
prove to be harmful for the industry, since economies of scale that the Western 
manufacturers have been enjoying and the lower level of tariffs would allow them to 
provide better quality vehicles in very competitive prices. On the other hand others 
believed that the WTO accession would have a positive impact since it would rationalize 
the industry and attract more foreign investments. 
 
In the first part of the paper, a presentation of the historical evolution of the Chinese 
automotive industry will be given, so that we have a good idea of how it evolved, how 
back in the history it goes and get the background knowledge needed. The second part 
focuses on the WTO accession period, focusing on the few years of negotiations before 
2001 and mainly after the official accession until now. The third part will refer to some 
Chinese automobile manufacturers who managed to effectively compete with the big 
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multinationals and their joint ventures and their efforts in exporting vehicles to other 
markets. 
 
 
1.2 Statement of purpose and research method 
 
In this paper there will be an effort to estimate whether the WTO accession has had a 
positive impact on the Chinese automotive industry and try to identify the problems and 
the challenges the Chinese automotive industry faces in a global and very competitive 
environment, as well as forecast and estimate the future potential of the industry, 
especially in turbulent times like the one we are living in.  
 
By using a descriptive analysis and describing the process of the Chinese automobile 
industry’s evolution from the very beginnings of it until now and based on various 
sources and previous studies an effort is made to answer one of the greatest question in 
the global automotive industry of our times; can the Chinese follow the Japanese and 
Korean examples in going global and become competitive towards the Japanese, 
European and American giants? In addition, could the current crisis the world has been 
facing become an unexpected ally to them and if so can they take advantage of it? 
 
 
1.3 Previous research 
 
Much research has been done on the Chinese economy, especially after 1978 when the 
reforms began. The unsurpassable growth rates, the impressive duration of these rates as 
well as the very interesting combination of socialism and capitalism has made the 
economy a very hot research subject. Taking into account the importance of the 
automotive industry for the country’s economy one should expect that there has been a 
lot of research on the industry as well. Indeed the bibliography is very big on the field, 
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with many papers, articles and books dedicated to the industry’s growth, especially after 
it was officially characterized as a pillar of the economy in the late 1990’s. Harwit (2001) 
came up with three possible outcomes stating that “little real change would be possible if 
the WTO rules failed to have an active impact”. Apart from Harwit`s study, numerous 
articles had been written in favor or against the oncoming changes but most referring to 
the economy in general, rather than focusing on the automotive industry specifically such 
as Lee (2000) – WTO entry and the changing structure of Chinese industry or Brilliant’s 
(2004) research for the US Chamber of Commerce. 
 
However, the vast majority of the papers written on it are mainly speculative on the 
effects of the WTO accession after 2001, since they were mainly written before or around 
that time. In addition, the ones written after 2001 had very few years of data and 
experience to deal with, making it very difficult to have a very clear idea of a longer term 
effect on the industry, as well as the efforts of the Chinese brands to export cars to the 
West, a goal that seemed too far fetched 6 or 7 years ago but not so much now. Lee 
(2003) concluded that the industry would probably benefit much from the ongoing WTO 
accession since the protectionism of the industry, the root of the problem as he 
characterizes it, would stop. 
 
Not many academic papers have been written to estimate the WTO effect on the Chinese 
auto industry though. There are numerous articles written in newspapers and websites 
dealing with the Chinese automotive industry but not much scientific research and 
academic papers, especially after 2004. This could be attributed to the fact that many 
people considered that this would actually be the case, and the facts have taken their side. 
However, the most interesting thing would be to be able to focus on the process rather the 
obvious, to many researchers, fact. One would need a few minutes by looking at the 
tables to realize the success of the WTO accession. However, the procedure as a whole is 
something very interesting to look at and try to analyze.  
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This paper hopes to add a bit more on the research on the field, since the data and 
resources used are as recent as possible and due to the timing is able to take into account 
the effects of the current crisis on the industry’s expansion plans. Hopefully more 
research will be done in the next years, especially on the role that the current crisis will 
have had when it is over, when the results of the crisis will be better understood and more 
years will have passed after the country’s WTO accession. We are still in the middle of 
the Chinese rise as the “big fourth” and what we can mainly do is to use the historical 
experience and the data we now have in order to try to understand the dynamics of the 
current situation in order to be able to speculate about the future with better chances of 
success. In addition, it seems that the presence or absence of similarities between the 
Chinese case now and the Japanese and Korean ones in the 1970s and 1960s have not 
been researched in depth leaving space for more research in the future. 
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 2: THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE      CHINESE 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
 
 
2.1 The Pre reform period 
 
In the past, as mentioned in the introduction, the “Big Three” term referred to the three 
biggest automotive manufacturing countries, the USA, Germany and Japan. After many 
years of impressive growth, it seems that the term will change into the “Big Four”, since 
China has been emerging as a huge market and vehicle producer. In this part there will be 
an effort to present an overview of the Chinese automotive industry, not just for the sake 
of the historical presentation as an introduction itself, but more importantly to be able to 
see how the industry has transformed from its early years and how the Chinese have been 
able to adjust to changes. As people say “look at the past and you will see your future” 
thus, trying to analyze the past of the industry, we might be able to make some very 
important conclusions about its future.  
 
One thing one should never forget is that the reform period did not follow a certain “blue 
print” but it was mainly a period of constant adjustments and experimentation in almost 
every field and industry. The automotive industry could not be an exception to that. The 
history of the industry can be mainly divided in three main periods: the pre reform period, 
starting from early 1920s until the beginning of the reforms, the period between the 
beginning of the reforms in 1978 until the WTO accession in 2001 and the post WTO 
accession, from 2001 until now. Even though the main breakthrough occurred during the 
reform period, we can say that the pre-reform period, before 1978, was a very interesting 
period, with some activity in the industry, not comparable to the Western industries of 
course, but a period that set the foundation for the post reform jump. 
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It could be said that the history of the Chinese automotive industry starts in the early 
1950s. However, there was some activity a few decades earlier, in the beginning of the 
previous century, as early as the 1920s. With the introduction of the automobile in the 
1920s, big Chinese cities such as Shanghai and Tianjin started enjoying the benefits of 
automobile transportation. In 1927 the first truck was produced by the Shenyang Military 
Factory.1 Chinese automobile manufacturing and parts manufacturer factories were 
established in these areas, mainly for the manufacturing of medium and small sized 
trucks for government, as well as military use. However, due to the Japan-China war in 
the 1930s, most of them had to be transferred deep into the mainland, in order to be 
protected from the effects of the war. After the invasion, the Japanese built plants in these 
areas mainly for military vehicle manufacturing. When the Japanese left the country after 
the end of the war, these plants remained in those areas and the Chinese government 
started using them. Apart from this activity, however, it could be stated that big scale 
automotive industry did not really exist in China before the mid 1950s, except for a few 
outdated plants that produced vehicles for government use and some small scale 
workshops that assembled imported vehicles for government and military purposes. 
 
In the early 1950s the Chinese government realized the importance of the auto industry 
for the country and decided to establish a national automotive industry and started 
investing large amounts of money in order to do so, 6.6 billion Yuan.2 The first big 
automobile plant, the First Automotive Works (FAW) was established in the Changchun 
province with the financial and technical help and support of the Soviet Union who 
wanted the plant in that specific location in the northwest China, rather the East coast 
which was Beijing’s wish. The plant’s construction symbolized the beginning of the 
Chinese industry. In 1956, a small scale production of the named by Mao Zedong 
himself, Jiefang (liberalization in Chinese) trucks started.3 In 1958 FAW introduced the 
 
1 Lee, C. (1997). The Chinese Automobile industry: manufacturing system and technological strategy 
2 Li, G. (2004). Overview of the Chinese auto industry 
3 http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_aboutchina/2005-04/06/content_67722.htm 
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first passenger car made by a Chinese company, the Hongqi (Red Flag) which was 
manufactured for high ranking government officials. Very soon other factories producing 
jeeps, trucks and passenger cars appeared throughout the country. Soon, almost every 
province had its own plant, something that was very much helped by the regional 
decentralization of the Great Leap forward and the Cultural Revolution in the 1950s and 
1960s respectively. During this period, the Chinese automotive industry faced significant 
development. The total output of the industry rose from just 61 vehicles in 1955 to 
22,500 vehicles in 1960.4 The numbers seem to be, and indeed are, very small compared 
to the other industrialized countries; for example just Germany itself had the same year 
exported 841,169 vehicles.5 However, one should never forget that in the communistic 
China of those days, and for some years later as well, passenger cars were considered to 
be a luxury good and such car ownership was forbidden; this kind of vehicles were not 
imported for the general public, but only for government officials. Thus, the plant 
produced mainly light and medium sized trucks and passenger cars that would only be 
used for government or military purposes, even though it is believed by many researchers 
that the plants at that time did have the ability and the technology to produce passenger 
cars comparable to the European and American ones, especially since the other super 
power of the time, apart from the USA, the Soviet Union, was a close ally of the 
Chinese.6 
 
Over time, other automotive industries were established, such as the Shanghai 
Automobile Assembly plant in 1958 and the Second Automotive Works, which later 
changed its name into Dongfeng.7 A few years later, in the early 1960s, the central 
government introduced the Second Automotive Corporation (SAC), a vertically 
organized large plant that would produce middle sized military trucks in an isolated 
 
4 Holweg et al. (2005) The Past, Present and Future of Chinese Automotive Industry: A Value Chain 
Perspective 
5 Williams et al. (1994). Cars 
6 Harwit, E. (2004). The Impact of the WTO membership on the Automobile Industry in China 
7 Qiu. (2005) China’s automotive industry 
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mountainous area, following the FAW Soviet type of plant, preparing for a war that was 
never meant to be between the Soviet Union and the USA.8 Even though the Chinese 
government wanted to build the plant in the coastal area, just like the FAW case, the 
Soviet Union preferred it to be near its borders and since they would provide financial 
and technical support for its construction it was finally built up in the north. In addition, 
from the mid 1960s, along with the continuous development of former primary plants 
such as Shanghai Passenger Car Plant (SPCP), some vehicle plants were established in 
different areas for local transportation needs; plants like the Beijing Jeep Plant, the first 
Western “invasion” into China’s developing automobile industry, Tianjin and Shenyang 
Auto Works and others. As mentioned before, these plants did not produce commercial 
vehicles. They began to imitate and trial produce vehicles for government purposes, 
mainly trucks.9 
 
 
 
2.2 The Reform period: 1978-present 
 
The reform period has been a story of impressive success and growth for China as a 
whole and consequently the country’s automotive industry in specific. The period has 
been characterized by a rapid annual average growth of real GDP of almost 10.5 
percent.10 The growth of the industry’s production levels from 4,030 vehicles in 1982 to 
over 2 million passenger cars, buses and trucks in 2002,11 the first year after WTO 
accession and more than 8 million in 2008 is one of the most remarkable success stories 
in history. The passenger car industry specifically was a minor part of the industry as a 
whole. As late as in 1985 the passenger car production was just a total of almost 5,200 
 
8 Chen, J. (1998) Different Behaviors of Chinese Auto Firms in Technology Introduction and Assimilation 
9 Committee on the Future of Personal Transport Vehicles in China. (2003). Personal Cars and China 
10 Chen, J. (2005) Assessing China's economic performance since 1978: Material attainments and beyond 
11 KPMG. (2003). China automotive and components part market 
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cars.12 Since 1978, when the reform period began, along with the economy as a whole, 
there has been a very impressive growth and evolution in the automotive industry in the 
country. Ever since the industry’s orientation changed from the previous centralized plan 
to a more market oriented model, the development of the industry has been huge, turning 
the country into the biggest vehicle manufacturer in the world. 
 
The opening of the market brought significant changes in the industry. In 1979 the 
number of the imported passenger cars in China was only 667 cars. By 1980 the imported 
passenger cars’ number skyrocketed to 20,000, putting serious pressure on China’s stock 
of foreign exchange at the time, something that seriously worried the central government. 
In 1981 the State Planning Commission issued temporary limitations on the production 
and import of cars but they had a very short term effect on a market that was about to 
explode. Vehicle imports shot up again resulting to a 20:1 scale of imports and domestic 
production in 1985.13 As early as in 1981, the Chinese government, realizing that 
automobile firms should focus on manufacturing well designed products for companies 
and individuals rather than standard products for the government, established the China 
Automotive Industry Company (CAIC) in order to reorganize the industry. The reform 
aimed at lowering the industry’s entry barriers by shifting from central to more local 
control, stimulating the automobile consumption and encouraged the manufacturing of 
automobiles in more local areas. Thus the local governments would be able to make 
decisions about investments at the local level, bureaucracy would be much less intense 
and the incentives for the local governments would be much more since the had the 
ability to make decisions. Table 1-1 shows the vehicle imports in China in the 1980s. The 
extremely high numbers of imported cars from 1984 to 1986 was caused by the infamous 
Hainan island vehicle binge in 1984 when the island was excluded from the 260 percent 
import duty imposed to the country in order to spur development. However, the Hainan 
 
12 Beijing Institute of Technology Press. (1996). Automotive Industry of China, p. 12 
 
13 Noble et al. (2005). Executioner or Disciplinarian: WTO Accession and the Chinese Auto Industry 
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government took advantage of this preferential policy and flooded the country with 
Japanese cars. Even after the end of the preferential policy in 1984 the imports were still 
at very high levels for two more years since there was a big demand for reliable Japanese 
trucks and taxis, a trend that stopped in 1985 when the government imposed new 
limitations in the ability of the people to buy imported cars.14 
 
Table 0-1: China vehicle imports 1981-1990 
 China vehicle imports 1981-1990 
  Cars Trucks Total 
1981 1,401 20,771 41,575
1982 1,101 7,731 16,077
1983 5,806 8,445 25,156
1984 21,651 28,047 88,743
1985 105,775 111,492 353,992
1986 48,276 64,571 150,052
1987 30,536 17,554 67,182
1988 57,433 14,201 99,233
1989 45,001 12,587 85,554
1990 24,063 18,395 65,429
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook, 1999 
 
What one should have in mind as far as the evolution of the industry is concerned, should 
be the fact that the beginning of the reforms and the opening up of the country, there was 
a sharp increase in tourism, which in cooperation with the constant increase of the 
average income in the country led to higher demand for taxis, apart from private cars.15 
 
14 Harwit, E. (1995). China’s automobile industry: policies, problems and prospects 
 
15 Harwit, E. (2001) The Impact of the WTO membership on the Automobile Industry in China 
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The growth in inbound tourism has been as exceptional, as the growth of the rest of the 
economy. In 1978 the total amount of tourists in the country was just a bit more than 1.8 
million people, whereas the number in 2000 was more than 80 million.16 It is worth to 
mention that local governments have supported the joint ventures by purchasing big 
numbers of cars for local taxi companies. Shanghai, for example, is famous for the 
extremely large fleet of the Shanghai Volkswagen Santana taxis. 
 
However, by that time the technological level of the Chinese automotive industry lagged 
far behind the Western and Japanese ones’. Thus, in order to get access to the technology 
that Chinese companies did not possess, the Chinese government gave the permission to 
Chinese firms to start establishing joint ventures with foreign assemblers and part 
suppliers in order to meet the demand in the market, under the provision that the foreign 
part’s share would not be more than 50 percent, in order to protect the local companies.17 
This was a very good opportunity for foreign companies as well, since they would have 
the chance to get access to the Chinese market, a market that at that point was quite 
small, due to the much lower income levels, compared to other countries, but a market 
that had huge potential, with more than one billion future potential customers. Even 
though many believe that the most important reason the Western and Japanese car 
manufacturers entered the Chinese market was cheap labor, most people from the 
industry would disagree. The costs might be lower in many cases, however not as low as 
many would believe since there are many non wage expenses that a company should take 
care of; expenses such as accommodation for the workers and their families, health 
insurance etc.  
 
The main reason for the huge interest that companies from the developed countries are 
interested in China is the potential of the country’s market. The continuously increasing 
income of the Chinese middle class and the population of the country are things one 
 
16 Lim, P. (2002) An econometrics analysis of the inbound tourism in China 
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should not ignore. The potential of the market was and still is so big that future sales to a 
market of more than 1 billion people, was much more important to their eyes. One should 
never forget that the car ownership density in China, even in our days is much lower than 
most countries. Table 1-2 provides the automobile ownership density for year 2003 in 
various countries. We see that 14 cars for every 1,000 people is a very low ratio, 
compared with European countries or the US something that signifies the huge potential 
of the market and leaves no questions on why all the multinational automotive 
manufacturers are trying to get access in the Chinese market. A big share in a future 
market of 1.4 billion people could mean a massive increase of a company’s global sales 
levels. 
 
Table 0-2: Car ownership in China 
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Source: BNP Paribas18 
Note: “Developed China” refers to the big industrialized cities, mainly of the coastal areas 
 
However, most of the early joint venture attempts did not do very well. Due to the strict 
joint venture limits that the Chinese government had set most of the foreign companies 
invested mainly orienting towards market access than operational efficiency. As 
mentioned before, according to the Chinese law a foreign partner could have only up to 
 
17 Noble et al. (2005). Executioner or Disciplinarian: WTO Accession and the Chinese Auto Industry 
18 BNP Paribas, Conjocture. (2005). Overview of automotive industry in China and South Korea, Market 
outlook, Risks and Opportunities 
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50 percent of the joint venture and assemble only one model, produce one type of part 
and form a joint venture with up to two Chinese partners. Thus, Japanese companies like 
Suzuki and Honda, less willing to invest on full scale ventures signed technology 
licensing agreements with Chinese companies, in order to get the rights to export more to 
China. The 1986 ban on imports by the government, a reaction to a sharp increase in 
imported cars the previous year, did not help make the situation better and in addition it 
damaged the not very strong at that point indeed, Japanese exporters’ faith in the Chinese 
rule of law, thus lowered their incentives to invest in greater scale. As far as the first joint 
venture in China, the Beijing Jeep which was formed in 1984, it was not very successful 
due to serious miscommunication problems and conflicting interests, even though the 
Chinese government tried to support the joint venture as much as it could and make it 
look actually better than what it really was.19 The main problem that the Beijing Jeep 
faced was actually a problem that almost all joint ventures faced, some to a greater and 
some to a less extent. The Chinese part was mainly interested in getting access to the 
more advanced technology in order to develop a competitive automotive industry in the 
future, whereas the Western parts were mainly interested in getting access to the Chinese 
market. In addition, the lack of rule of law and more importantly the poor intellectual 
rights protection laws made it more difficult for the Westerners to be willing to share 
technology; consequently, most vehicles, even in our days, are mainly older models that 
are kept in production for China.20 A very typical example of this situation is the known 
as “the Shanghai model” or as formally known the Volkswagen Santana model, a model 
that is considered and actually is very outdated in the Western markets and whose 
production was stopped almost a decade ago in Europe, but which is still being produced 
in China. According to a survey conducted for Sino-American joint ventures in 2006 
 
19 Mann, J. (1989). Beijing Jeep: The Short, Unhappy Romance of American Business in China. New York: 
Simon and Schuster 
20Gallagher, K. (2006). China Shifts Gear 
 15 
 
15
                                                
many Chinese consider the American parts to be interested only in selling in China and 
not developing vehicles there and that they should be more open technologically.21 
  
As far as the European manufacturers are concerned, they were very interested in 
investing in China as well. The first European company to enter the market forming a 
joint venture was the French Peugeot. Unfortunately, the company had to pull out after 
suffering heavy losses since it failed to successfully transfer technology to its plant in 
Guangzhou. However, the French did not give up and in 2005 the PSA Peugeot Citroen 
Group made a second attempt to form a joint venture with Dongfeng Automobile and in 
2006 the company sold 201,300 vehicles.22 In addition, a second joint venture was 
formed with the Chinese carmaker Hafei, a carmaker in Shenzhen province, in 2007. 
According to Clissold (2005), early joint ventures often faced the same problems: the 
legacies of Stalinist socialism, the lack of rule of law and the very weak management of 
most Chinese companies which had caused serious problems in the companies’ 
functionality. 
 
However, apart form the unsuccessful attempts by some foreign companies to form 
successful joint ventures in China there have been some stories of great success. The 
most significant example is the success of Volkswagen (VW) with the Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) in Shanghai and recently with the First Auto 
Works in Changchun.23 The joint venture between VW and the SAIC was formed in 
1985, formulating a plant that had the capacity of productivity of 300,000 vehicles per 
year. Having the full support of the Shanghai municipal government, which did all it 
could do to help by purchasing many vehicles for taxis and municipal purposes and by 
providing supportive regulations as well as a tax privilege system, the joint venture was 
very successful and reached passenger cars sales market share of almost 50 percent of the 
 
21 Gallagher, K. (2006). International Technology Transfer in China’s Auto Sector 
22 Clissold, T. (2005). Mr. China: A Memoir. New York: Harper Business 
23 China daily, VW opens new joint venture with FAW, 12/08/2004 
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Chinese market in 2000.24 Even though the company’s sales have now fallen to much 
lower numbers after the successful entrance of other major global players in the Chinese 
market, such as the American GM, as well as the growth of Chinese companies like 
Geely and Cherry, it still remains number one company in China with a capacity of 
almost 2 million vehicles annually. In addition, smaller companies like Geely and Cherry 
are considered by many the only Chinese car manufacturers that have a realistic potential 
of reaching the production limit of 250 thousand vehicles, a production that is considered 
to be the limit that leads to economies of scale25 and compete with the Western and 
Japanese ones in the short term future. 
In 1986, the seventh five year plan was the first that referred to the vehicle industry as a 
“pillar” industry,26 meaning a factor of growth for the whole country’s economy, stating 
clearly that it was very important for the country’s economic development. The same 
year, the Chinese government tried to consolidate the industry’s production in the three 
companies that dominated the market at that point, the First Auto Works (FAW), the 
Shanghai SAIC and the Second Auto Works, or Dongfeng. The two first were to produce 
medium size cars and the latter would be oriented towards small vehicles. Resistance 
from localities however did not let the government’s plans work as the government 
wished, so the plan was expanded into a “three big, three small” plan in order to include 
other joint ventures of Beijing Jeep, Guangzhou Peugeot and Tianjin Xiali (Daihatsu). In 
addition, the military which had been aiming at the production of civilian vehicles, signed 
agreements with the Japanese companies Suzuki, Fuji and Isuzu and resisted the 
industry’s consolidation as well. All the above resulted in the failure of the government’s 
plan. 
 
 
 
24 Committee on the Future of Personal Transport Vehicles in China. (2003). Personal Cars and China 
25 Husan. (1997). The continuing importance of economies of scale in the automotive industry 
26 Lui, H. (2007). Does government intervention help the Chinese automobile industry? A comparison with 
the Chinese computer industry 
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In 1994, the Chinese government after 3 years of impressive vehicle production growth 
(1994 production was almost three times bigger than 1991) introduced the first specific 
policy document.27 The “Automobile Industry Policy” was announced in July 1994 and 
had 13 chapters and 61 policies. The result of the new policy was an even more intense 
interest on behalf of foreign auto assemblers and part suppliers to enter the market, 
especially before the WTO accession in order to establish a strong position in the Chinese 
market before the WTO accession which was about to happen in a few years’ time. The 
same year, General Motors (GM) signed a contract with SAIC in Shanghai and became 
the second foreign company to form a joint venture with SAIC after Volkswagen. GM 
made an investment of 1.6 billion dollars to produce modern and more technologically 
advanced models, such as the Buick Regal and the Century models, and in addition to 
help SAIC built a research and development (RnD) center in Shanghai. In return, the 
Shanghai municipal authorities helped GM construct the plant in less than two years gave 
the company the freedom it needed to grow fast, freedom much greater than the one VW 
had enjoyed a few years before.28 The determination of both sides to make a successful 
joint venture in Shanghai led to the first produced car in mid December, after a record 
time of building up a whole factory in just 18 months.29 Facing GM’s competition, VW 
invested in the development of new models and put pressure on the local government for 
the same preferential treatment GM was enjoying. In the province of Guangzhou, Honda 
replaced Peugeot at the local joint venture with Dongfeng when Peugeot decided to 
withdraw from its first joint venture after the serious losses it had been facing. In the 
same time, Toyota formed a new joint venture in Tianjin, a big industrial city northeast of 
Beijing, increased its stake in Daihatsu and formed various joint ventures with local parts 
manufacturers and proved the company’s long term commitment to the Chinese market.30 
 
27Lee, et al. (2005). The Impact of Globalization on the Chinese Automobile Industry: Policy Assessments 
and Typology of Strategies 
28 Business Week. 17/6/1997; Times Asia. 22/5/2000 
29  The New York Times, The China drive, 22/5/2000 
30 Thun, E. (2006). Changing Lanes in China: Foreign Direct Investment, Local Governments, and Auto 
Sector Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
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The following table briefly summarizes the developments and the characteristics of each 
period, in the Chinese automotive industry from the early 1950s until early 2000s.31 
 
 
Table 0-3: Historical periods of the industry 
Period 
 
Characteristics 
1953-65: Self reliance policy Roughly 60,000 vehicles produced per year. Relied on 
Soviet technologies.  
No other international contacts.  
Provincial governments set up production units. By 
1960, 16 auto producers and 28 assembly companies. 
1966-80: Security oriented Government invested heavily in western regions. 
Remote locations caused problems and overcapacity.  
Focus on military vehicles.  
Rapid increase in car demand and capacity of 160,000 
units per year.  
58 car makers, 192 assembly companies and 2,000 
spare parts producers. 
1981-98: Initial fruits of open-door policy Number of companies almost doubled during 83-85 to 
114 units.  
By 1998 almost 2,500 production units. Provisional 
governments further regionalized production.  
Major international firms investing.  
                                                 
31 Francois, S. (2004). Regulated efficiency, WTO accession and the Motor Vehicle Sector in China, The 
World Bank 
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Joint ventures account for almost 60% of production. 
1999-present: opening up and beyond Major investments by foreign companies.  
All major Japanese and German companies in China.  
Capacity of more than 8 million units in 2008. 
 
The second part of the paper will focus on the post WTO accession period until now, 
meaning mainly 2001 up to the present. There will be an effort to describe the WTO 
accession period, the concerns that were raised by many the years before 2001 and the 
development the industry has sustained for the past 8 years. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE WTO ERA 
 
 
3.1 The WTO accession period 
 
The talks on the Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization took a very long 
time. After almost fifteen years of negotiations, China entered the WTO in September of 
2001. One of the main reasons of this very long period was the lack of an advanced legal 
system in the country. Significantly important was the lack of bankruptcy law. The 
socialist heritage did not allow for bankruptcies in the past, since the State would bail out 
any problematic and loss making state companies; that was the so called “soft budget” 
constraint. So, in order to gain time to develop a more advanced legal system and 
bankruptcy law, the Chinese government delayed the accession for a few years.  
 
As far as the automotive industry is concerned, as mentioned in the introduction of this 
paper, there were many who feared that the WTO accession would mean serious 
problems for the industry. The fears were actually logical; lower tariffs combined with 
the economies of scale that global automotive manufacturers enjoyed (meaning cheaper 
vehicles) would lead to a flooding of cheap and better quality vehicles from abroad, 
which in combination with better marketing abilities and more popular and respected 
brand names would cause serious problems to the domestic Chinese automotive industry. 
It would make sense to expect that people would choose to buy an imported Toyota, than 
a locally manufactured car for example, both for quality as well as prestige reasons. 
However, others believed that the WTO accession would actually prove to be good for 
the industry, since it would rationalize it and attract even more foreign investments. As it 
was said by a researcher “the Chinese would have to swim or drown”. Looking at the 
evolution of the industry since 2001, the answer to who was actually right and who was 
not is quite obvious. However, it would be quite helpful and important to see what kind 
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of concerns there were the years before China’s accession to the WTO, since there were 
quite a few people, scholars as well as government officials who were very worried about 
the WTO’s accession side-effects on the country in general, as well as the automotive 
industry more specifically. One should never forget that the automotive industry was and 
still is considered a pillar for the whole economy and a very important industry, 
something that was clearly stated in the tenth and eleventh five year plans.32 
 
 
3.1.1 The concerns 
 
After the economic growth that the country faced after the opening of the economy in 
1978 and the transition from a state planned economy to a market oriented one the WTO 
accession was considered by many as very important for the country’s continuation of 
economic growth. The trade to GDP ratio had increased from almost 10 percent to 40 
percent and inflows of foreign investment (FDI) had surpassed 40 billion dollars in 
2000.33 In order to sustain these very high growth rates, the Chinese government pursued 
the WTO accession. It could be stated that the Chinese government’s motivation for 
joining the WTO was the fact that the economy needed an external force to overcome 
domestic obstacles and rationalize in many sectors, as well as protect its trade interests in 
order to sustain the economic growth it had been facing in 1980s and 1990s.  
 
As far as the automotive industry is concerned, as mentioned in the introduction of this 
paper, there were many who feared that WTO accession would mean serious problems 
for the industry. Some party leaders feared that opening to the world would cause 
significant employment loses in the farming countryside as well as workers’ places in the 
rural areas due to the inability of the local industries to compete with imported foreign 
 
32 China Daily. Auto industry overview. http://bizchina.chinadaily.com.cn/guide/industry/industry2.htm 
33 Adhikari. Yang. (2002). What will WTO membership mean for China and its trading partners?. IMF 
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products.34 According to the WTO accession opponents lower tariffs combined with the 
economies of scale that global automotive manufacturers enjoyed (meaning cheaper 
vehicles) would lead to a flooding of cheap and better quality vehicles from abroad, 
which in combination with better marketing abilities and more popular and respected 
brand names would cause serious problems to the Chinese automotive industry. Many 
feared that foreign companies with little production in China, such as Daimler Chrysler, 
Ford, Nissan and others would choose aggressive strategies in importing their vehicles to 
the Chinese market instead of investing heavier in the country which in combination with 
the eagerness that the Chinese people had for foreign cars before the WTO accession 
would pose a great threat to the industry.35 A very important thing one should have in 
mind is the fact that Chinese leaders were very interested in employment, since 
employment keeps social stability. That is why the 8 percent annual economic growth is 
considered to be significantly important for the Chinese government, since it is the level 
that keeps employment at levels that are considered to be “safe” from causing social 
unrest. In simpler words, the state would not want millions of unemployed, frustrated 
people, especially when there is a lack of an advanced social welfare system that could 
provide a “safety net” for them. More specifically, as far as the automotive industry was 
concerned, the State Council had expressed serious fears about the consequences of the 
WTO “side-effects” on the industry,36 warning about serious employment losses, up to 
half a million jobs in the industry.  
 
Another concern that many shared was the uncertainty that many local Chinese 
automobile manufacturers would face in the post WTO era. The number of vehicle 
manufacturers had risen from just 20 in the 1960s to 60 in the 1970s and almost 125 in 
the early 1990s, most of which were local inefficient manufacturers with low production 
 
34 Harwit, E. (2001). The Impact of the WTO membership on the Automobile Industry in China 
35 Harwit, E. (2001). The Impact of WTO Membership on the Automobile Industry in China 
36 Lardy, N. (2002) Integrating China into the Global Economy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press 
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volumes and low quality standards. The situation in the parts industry was and still is 
much worse with huge numbers of low quality inefficient companies in the market. These 
manufacturers were very unlikely to prove competitive without state support against the 
expected post WTO accession imports.37 38 Of course, not only some Chinese were 
worried about the outcome of the country’s upcoming accession to the WTO. On the 
other side of the WTO agreement, many of the countries that were already members of 
the organization feared that the heritage of a planned economy and the lack of rule of law 
would not constrain the behavior of the Chinese firms towards mainly intellectual 
property issues and the government’s support on some domestic companies and maintain 
the problems that the Chinese economy had been facing. 
 
On the other hand, proponents of the WTO accession believed that the accession would 
actually prove to be good for the country and the automotive industry in specific, since it 
would rationalize it and attract even more foreign investments.39 Poorly performing 
factories would have to reorganize and lower their costs, as well as improve their quality, 
in order to be competitive in a much more competitive market something that applied in 
the parts manufacturer sector as well. In addition, Chinese products would gain easier 
access to the world markets and the Chinese government would have new legal avenues 
to appeal if there were any unfair restrictions on Chinese products in foreign markets. 
The Chinese would have to swim or drown indeed. 
 
WTO accession was a very important step for the Chinese government. It would not just 
be a very good opportunity to keep rationalizing the country’s economy and facilitate 
trade with the rest of the world. Apart from that there were other, very important gains for 
china as well. The WTO, in contrast to other bilateral agreements or some open 
arrangements such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) provides lures, 
 
37 Harwit, E. (1995). China’s automobile industry: Policies, Problems and Prospects 
38 People Daily. Impact on Chinese sectors after WTO entry. 16/9/2001 
39 Beijing Evening News. 18/11/1999 
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monitoring and enforcement of the agreements, in a way that is considered legitimate and 
acceptable by its members.40 In the case of China, this would mean the end of the annual 
debates in the American Congress on the renewal of China’s most favoured nation status. 
In addition, WTO accession would mean less arbitrary action against Chinese exported 
products in various markets of the world. Considering the fact that the Chinese economy 
was and still is heavily oriented to exports, this can be considered as a very important 
factor. On the other hand, as said before, China’s trade partners hoped to gain better 
access to the huge and continuously growing market of the country. The WTO accession 
would reduce the uncertainty about the country’s institutions and rule of law, thus make 
investments in the country safer, something that would lead to increased investments, 
since companies from abroad would not risk that much. As was mentioned in the first 
part of this paper, one of the main reasons that the Japanese big automotive 
manufacturers entered the Chinese market late was the fact that they did not trust Chinese 
institutions and feared that the lack of rule of law in China would cause serious problems 
in their investments in the future. The increase of the foreign investments in the post 
WTO era is quite significant, something that will be dealt with in more detail in later 
parts of this paper. 
 
Feensta et al (2001) conducted a study in order to estimate the impact that the WTO 
accession would have on the Chinese automotive industry. According to their research 
there were three possible scenarios. The first scenario, which was the negative one, 
basically shared the opponents’ of the WTO accession fears: the WTO membership 
would have a negative impact on the industry, since the domestic industry would be 
swamped by imported products and become a minor player. According to the scenario, 
companies with small production in China would rather become aggressive importers of 
cheaper and better quality vehicles. The second scenario was that of a positive impact on 
the industry, with the industry able to rise to the challenge of the WTO membership. Big 
 
40 Ravenhill, J. (1999). APEC and the WTO: Which Way Forward for Trade Liberalization?. 
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players would remain loyal to the market and improve their products, and start targeting 
towards low end economic cars aiming at the Chinese middle class. According to this 
scenario, China would eventually absorb foreign technology and become a new world 
class automobile producer, like South Korea did in the 1990s. The third scenario, which 
was the most probable one, was between the previous two ones.41 According to this 
scenario, the WTO rules would not have a serious impact on the Chinese industry since 
China would keep the protectionist policy it had been using throughout its reform period, 
at the provincial level this time however, since the WTO rules would ban some of its 
policy measures, such as tariffs and quotas. 
 
 
3.1.2 Entering the WTO/China’s commitments 
 
China’s commitments to the WTO were very deep. The commitments that were relevant 
to the automotive industry banned, or at least made difficult to use, some of the most 
important policy tools that the government had been using all these years in order to 
protect the industry. Under the WTO commitments China would have to liberalise the 
automotive market with respect to such fields as tariffs, non-tariffs, investments and trade 
in services. The new requirements included the following:42 
 
 Gradual elimination of quotas and licenses concerning the imported consumer 
vehicles and vehicle parts, starting gradually from 2001, until the final elimination 
 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 21 
41 Feensta et al. (1999). From import substitution to WTO accession: Government intervention in the 
Chinese automotive market 
42 United States of America. International Trade Administration. December/2001. 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/China/Docs/industryfactsheets/autos.html 
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limitation is a limitation of the industry’s growth as well and that it should be 
                                                
in 2005. The initial quota on imported automobiles in automobiles in 2002 was 6 
billion US dollars but by the end of 2005 all import quotas had to be eliminated.43 
 Tariff cuts. In 2001 the tariffs o passenger cars were 70 percent for cars with 
engine capacity lower than 3 litres and 80 percent for the ones with engines bigger 
than that. According to the agreement, the 2006 tariff levels had to lower to 25 
percent. In addition, vehicle components and parts tariffs had to drop to 9.5 
percent by 2006, from the levels of 15 to 50 percent in 2001.44 
 Opening of various service sectors such as banking, insurance and non-banking 
auto financing, import-export of automobiles and distribution services, leasing, as 
well as wholesale and retail trade. 
 Elimination of certain requirements on foreign investors, such as local content 
requirements, export performance requirements and foreign exchange 
requirements 
 Amendments lifting certain restrictions concerning what types of vehicles or 
models would be permitted for production. 
 A higher limit of investments that would be allowed to be approved at the 
provincial level; gradually from 30 million dollars in 2001 to reach 150 million 
dollars in 2005. In addition the removal of the 50 percent foreign equity limit on 
joint ventures. 
 Respect for patents, trademarks and other intellectual property rights (IP rights). 
 
Even though China was deprived of most of its most important economic policy tools, it 
kept the right to the limit of 50 percent ownership in joint ventures in the industry, which 
still applies, even though there have been voices against it’s usefulness for the benefit of 
the Chinese industry since it is believed by many scholars and researchers that this 
 
43 China daily. Auto industry overview and the WTO commitments. 
http://bizchina.chinadaily.com.cn/guide/industry/industry2-03.htm 
44 KPMG. (2003). China automotive and component part market 
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fter the Tiananmen square incident in 1989 and a couple of years of political instability 
able 0-1: Vehicle production 1960-2001 
abolished.45 In addition, even after 2006, five years after accession, the country’s tariffs 
on consumer vehicles and parts were higher than many other countries. For example 
South Korea’s auto tariffs are now at the level of 8 percent, significantly lower than the 
15 to 25 percent that the Chinese industry enjoys.46 
 
A
that had a negative effect on the country’s economy as well, the Chinese automotive 
industry faced significant growth and vehicle production tripled in the years from 1991 to 
1993. The following years until the WTO accession in 2001 were years of modest 
growth. Even though it took only 3 years (1991-1993) for the production to triple in the 
early 1990s, the industry needed almost seven years for the production to triple again in 
2000.47 However, after WTO accession, it did so again only after 2 years, surpassing for 
the first time the limit of 2 million vehicles.48 The following table provides the numbers 
of cars manufactured during the reform period from 1978 to 2001. As will be described in 
the next paragraph the growth in the post WTO vehicle production has been much more 
intense. 
 
T
Vehicle Production 
   Passenger cars
1960 98 
1970 196 
1980 5,148 
                                                 
45 Haddock, K. (2008). China’s auto policy, structured for success?, Autofocusasia.com 
http://www.autofocusasia.com/management/china_auto_policy.htm 
46 Odyssey, B. Korean, Malaysian Auto Barriers Pose Trade Negotiation Challenge, www.america.gov 
02/05/2006 
47 Feng et al. (2008). Developmentalism in Globalization: The Transformation of Chinese Automotive 
Industry since late 1990s 
48 Noble et al. (2005). Executioner or Disciplinarian: WTO Accession and the Chinese Auto Industry 
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161992 1,745 
1993 229,745 
1994 247,631 
1995  329,728 
1996  388,192 
1997 481,611 
1998 465,139 
1999 570,001 
2000 604,677 
2001 717,791 
Source: Holweg et al. (2005) The Past, Present and Future of Chinese Automotive Industry: A Value Chain 
Perspective, 2005/ Car production in the People’s Republic of China, statistics pages, 2002 
.2 The impact of WTO accession in the industry 
ooking at the evolution of the industry since 2001, the answer to whether the fears of 
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L
the opponents of the WTO accession were right or not is quite obvious. After almost 8 
years after China’s WTO accession we can now make an assessment on the impact on the 
Chinese automotive industry. The data that we have now show that the growth of the 
industry has been even more impressive, in contrast to the pessimistic forecasts that had 
been expressed in the pre-WTO period. The sedan production for example has increased 
dramatically since 2001. It is worth to mention that in 2003 the USA car production 
compared the Chinese one was three times bigger, whereas in 2008 the Chinese managed 
to overcome the US for the first time in history by almost seven percent.49 More 
specifically, the passenger car production in 2000 was almost 605,000 vehicles50 whereas 
 
49www.eetasia.com. China outperforms U.S. in 2008 auto production. 02/4/2009 
#country50 Global Car Production. (2002). http://www.geocities.com/fbessem/carprod.html  
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able 0-2: Vehicle production 2001-2008 
the country’s production for the same kind of vehicles in 2008 was roughly 9.3 million 
vehicles. Even though the Chinese car quality lags behind in comparison to the European, 
American and Japanese ones, many believe that it seems that it is only a matter of a few 
years for the Chinese to reach the “Big Three” quality levels.51 Table 2-2 provides the 
vehicle production data after the WTO accession. 
 
T
Vehicle production 
2001 2.341.700 
2002 3.251.000 
2003 4.443.900 
2004 5.091.100 
2005 5.704.900 
2006 7.278.900 
2007 8.890.000 
2008 9.300.000 
S Chi Yearbooks, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
nother positive impact of China’s WTO accession on the industry is the continuous 
the WTO accession has brought to China, the technology transfer becomes faster and 
ource: na Statistical 
 
A
improvements in the technology and quality of the vehicles in the market. Wang (2001) 
pointed that when investors are located behind tariffs barriers they are not very willing to 
transfer technology to the market since they do not face serious competition, since the 
outdated technology they have already introduced is sufficient for a non competitive 
market. A typical example of this state in Chinese auto market is the VW Santana model, 
a 1970s model that is still in production in China, even though outdated, with very few 
changes. However, when these manufacturers face increased competition, something that 
                                                 
51 Businessweek.com . Here Come Chinese Cars. 26/5/2005 
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ike to summarize the main characteristics of the post WTO era three things 
ould be of great importance: first of all the gradual rise of the Chinese vehicle 
                                                
more efficient. To continue with our VW Santana model example, VW officials have 
announced that the model will be of production in 2012, since the improvements in the 
technology and quality of the vehicles in the market have lately made it look outdated in 
the eyes of the Chinese consumers and more modern models, such as the Bora one, will 
take its place.52 The increased competition has dramatically increased the options the 
consumers have, apart from the quality and the lower prices that they have been enjoying 
lately. More specifically, in 2000 the Chinese consumers had to choose from just eight 
models in the passenger car market, whereas in 2003 there were 63 available ones53 and 
only 3 years later, in 2006 that was the number of the introductions just for the first half 
of the year.54 
 
If one would l
w
manufacturers, such as Geely and Chery. Chinese manufacturers took advantage of the 
niches in the low end car market, a market that the foreign joint ventures had been 
ignoring for some time, and produced affordable cars for the Chinese market. Having 
established a strong presence in the market now, many of them are gradually aiming at 
the higher quality and priced models. Even though the cars with a foreign brand name are 
still the majority there has been a constant decrease of the market share that TCNs have 
been enjoying. TNCs are currently producing two thirds55 of the vehicles in the market, a 
share much lower than the almost 90 percent that they enjoyed in the beginning of the 
century when the country was admitted to the WTO.56 It seems that the WTO accession 
proponent’s arguments were actually quite valid and that the accession did not damage 
the local vehicle manufacturers. On the contrary, many of them were forced to reorganize 
 
52 Autonews.gasgoo.com. 18/05/2009. http://autonews.gasgoo.com/auto-news/1010507/Shanghai-
Volkswagen-may-stop-making-Santana.html. 
53 Murphy, D. (2003). Cost of part keeps China out of export game. Far Eastern Economic Review 
54 KPMG. (2006). China’s passenger car market advisory 
55 Feng et al. (2006). Developmentalism in Globalization: The Transformation of Chinese Automotive 
Industry since late 1990s 
56 GL Group. The Path to Globalization of China’s Automotive Industry. 18/5/2009. www.glgroup.com 
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ry to what many feared, the gradual reduction of import tariffs 
atured rather than jeopardized the economy. Instead of creating a flood of imports, it 
                                                
and become more competitive in order to survive and with the help from local 
governments in some cases managed to improve their position in the market and increase 
their market shares. This trend is very likely to continue since the biggest Chinese 
manufacturers such as SAIC and FAW have been thinking of transferring from car 
production in their joint ventures with western manufacturers to making their own models 
and brands. A second characteristic of the post WTO accession era is the significant 
reduction in the manufacturers’ profitability.57 Even though this decade has been 
characterized by a very impressive growth in the volume of the sales, the prices have 
been reducing due to the increased competition and economies of scale and the 
profitability has been falling. Still however, the market is growing with impressive rates 
and is considered to be one of the “hottest” markets in the world, since the continuous 
improvements in the income levels of the Chinese middle class provides huge potential 
for the future decades. 
 
In addition, and contra
m
led to the more intense domestic competition with all the positive consequences 
mentioned above. From 2001 to 2006 the number of imported autos in China increased 
from 70 thousand to almost 170 thousand. However, since the growth of the market was 
much greater this resulted in a smaller market share for the imported autos, rather than 
the opposite. More specifically, for the same period, the market share of imported cars 
fell from 6 to 3 percent. The loss of the protective tariffs privilege actually made the 
domestic automakers cooperate more actively with their foreign counterparts and 
improve manufacturing and RnD capabilities, something that led to lower prices. During 
the first five years after the country’s WTO accession, from 2001 to 2006, the industry 
experienced an average annual sales growth of 25 percent and an 8 percent annual price 
 
approach from the view of scale economy 
57 Chen, Z. et al. (2005). China’s WTO accession impacts on domestic automobile industry. a rudimental 
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.3 The next step 
hina’s automotive industry is still facing some problems that could cause obstacles for 
s mentioned before, a major problem that the Chinese automotive industry has been 
                                                
fall, because of the increased competition.58 In addition, apart from the improvements as 
far as the quality and price level are concerned, the number of the models that were 
offered to the Chinese people increased dramatically. 
 
 
3
 
C
its future sustainable growth. These problems are mainly the industry’s overcapacity59 
and the relatively underdeveloped auto part industries and services as well as the very big 
number of the vehicle manufacturers in the country. China has more than 120 vehicle 
manufacturers, many of which are ineffective. Even though there has been some 
improvement in the auto part industry there is still much to be done and improved. It is 
positive that global players such as VW and GM have been willing to assist the local 
suppliers in improving their efficiency. In addition, as far as the auto finance sector is 
concerned, high capital requirements are a barrier to entry in this sector and results in less 
benefits for the consumers.60 
 
A
facing is the very big number of vehicle manufacturers. Since it is considered a pillar for 
the country’s economy, all provinces have been trying to develop their local automotive 
industries. However, most of them are small, outdated plants with very low production 
capacity and productivity. Among the almost 120 vehicle manufacturers in China, the top 
20 of them possess 90 percent of the market share. Consequently, the rest have very low 
production. What is more, even among the top 20, most are far from achieving 
 
58 www.fadaweb.com. (2007). What has WTO membership brought to China’s auto industry? 
59 autonews.gasgoo.com. Many Chinese automakers facing overcapacity. 2/12/2008 
 
60 US chamber of commerce. (2004). China’s WTO implementation 
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production volumes big enough to reach economies of scale and become competitive in 
the long term. The Chinese government, in their efforts to solve this problem, is currently 
working on a plan to create global players that will be able to compete with the current 
ones like GM, Volkswagen and Toyota. This rationalization of the industry will take 
some time however, since there will definitely be resistance. However, this is an 
important step to make since there are very few vehicle manufacturers that actually do 
have this potential and with some mergers and acquisitions and cooperation with other 
manufacturers there could be the potential of really competitive global brands in the 
future. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE CHINESE GLOBAL AUTO RUN 
 
 
4.1 The Chinese companies 
 
After September 2001 and the WTO accession one of the main changes that have 
occurred in the Chinese automobile industry is the challenged dominance of foreign cars 
in the market due to the consistent rise of the so called national cars. Since the beginning 
of the reforms, cars have been mainly manufactured by multinational companies in China 
in cooperation with local manufacturers; the joint ventures. As can be seen from the table 
6, the beginning of this century signified a significant increase in production capabilities 
and growth of Chinese vehicle manufacturers such as Geely and Chery.61  
 
Table 0-1: Geely/Chery production 
Production levels 
  Geely Chery 
2002 50 50
2003 80 90
2004 106 86
2005 150 188
2006 207 307
2007 219 381
2008   356
Source: various sources/compiled by the author 
 
                                                 
61 Feng et al. (2008). Developmentalism in Globalization: The Transformation of Chinese Automotive 
Industry since late 1990s 
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In addition, the Chinese partners in joint ventures with foreign companies, such as the 
FAW and the SAIC, are gradually beginning to transfer from manufacturing foreign cars 
in their joint ventures towards creating their own brands and vehicles, something that was 
apparent in the recent Shanghai automotive show held in 20th to 28th of April 2009 in 
Shanghai. It is no surprise that quite as recently as 2005, both largest Chinese vehicle 
manufacturers, SAIC and FAW, announced their plans for national cars, even though it is 
not likely that they become competitive with their own cars very soon.62 The 
opportunities that lie ahead for these Chinese companies are huge, taken into 
consideration that it is estimated that by 2020, 40 percent of the global sales and more 
than half of total production (55 percent) will be produced in Asia.63  
 
In this part of the paper, we will mainly deal with the potential that the Chinese vehicle 
manufacturers have to become global players and export big amounts of cars abroad, 
especially the purely domestic companies, such as Geely, Chery and Brilliance 
Automotive. These companies provide a very interesting case to study, since they have 
evolved into serious players in a market in which the competition is extremely intense, 
with global big players and less government support and protection than in the past, due 
to the WTO regulations. In addition, they have had to compete against joint ventures with 
global players many times their size, more experienced in the market and which have 
been enjoying the protection of local governments, such as the Volkswagen and General 
Motors joint ventures in Shanghai mentioned in the first part of this paper, as well as the 
promotion of the central government as well.  
 
Despite all the difficulties that these companies have been facing they have managed to 
evolve as top ten automobile manufacturers64 in China and even more surprisingly export 
pioneers. All three of them have already started exporting to Asian countries, as well as 
 
62 Chinese Economic Daily. Large auto groups make efforts in building self-reliance brands. 16/5/2006 
63 The Economist intelligence unit. (2006). Foresight 2020, economic industry and corporate trends 
64 See table 3-1 for details 
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other markets outside Asia, such as Eastern Europe and Middle East and have announced 
plans of introducing their models to the most competitive and demanding countries of 
Europe and North America. Their success in those markets will be the most important 
goal for the next few years to come, since success in those markets will give them the 
feature they mostly miss and what they are after by aiming west: a strong brand name. 
However, their approaches towards exports are not the same. Some have taken a more 
cautious and slow strategy and have been targeting the developing countries’ markets 
leaving Europe and North America for the future while others have approached the 
mature markets of the developed world in a more aggressive way, either by introducing 
their models in the markets or by mergers and acquisitions of western companies. The 
recent effort of Geely to buy the very strong Swedish brand SAAB from GM, even 
though it seems that it will not happen, is a proof that they are serious about it. 
 
 
4.1.1 The current situation 
 
The Chinese automotive industry was mainly developed with the help of foreign 
companies which formed joint ventures with the largest Chinese automakers, such as 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), the First Auto Works (FAW) and 
Dongfeng Motors. The current structure of the joint ventures in the industry is described 
in the following table.  
 
Table 0-2: Joint Ventures between Western and Chinese Automotive Firms 
Joint Ventures between Western and Chinese Automotive Firms 
BMW  Brilliance 
Daimler Chrysler  Beijing Jeep 
Ford  Chang’an 
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Ford  Jiangling 
General Motors  SAIC – Wulung 
General Motors  SAIC 
General Motors  Dongyue 
Honda  Guangzhou 
Honda  Dongfeng 
Honda  China Motors 
Hyundai  Beijing 
Hyundai  Dongfeng 
Mitsubishi Hunan 
Nissan  Dongfeng 
Nissan  Zhengzhou 
PSA (Peugeot-Citroen)  Dongfeng 
Suzuki  Chongqing 
Toyota  Tianjin 
Toyota  Sichuan 
VW  FAW 
VW  SAIC 
 
We see that foreign automakers have been cooperating with domestic ones through joint 
ventures that have been enjoying the support of the central and local governments. 
However, the industry has been witnessing the constant growth of other, smaller 
automakers such as Chery and Geely, which have much less or in some cases no support 
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from the authorities, apart from some local government help in some cases. These 
companies have taken the opportunity to expand abroad since the bigger and more 
powerful joint ventures have not been trying to export hard since the automotive industry 
in China is dominated by joint ventures whose foreign partners are not very likely to 
support exports in competition with their own products in other markets.65  
 
There are more than a hundred vehicle manufacturers in China, something that probably 
is the biggest problem the industry is facing and only few of them seem to have serious 
potential to become serious international players in the global automobile market; 
companies such as Geely, Chery, SAIC and Brilliance. Most of the other firms are too 
small to reach economies of scale and seriously lack technical and managerial skills. 
However some of these companies are constantly growing. We see that even though 
Volkswagen had almost half of the market share in 2000 and the rest would have to share 
the other half, it now only holds almost 15% with many other companies surpassing the 5 
percent levels (table 3-3). However, the production numbers are on the increase due to 
the market’s growth. 
 
Table 0-3: Vehicle producers’ market share in 2005 
Market share 2005 
Company Market share % 
VW 14 
GM 11 
Honda 9 
Hyundai 8 
FAW 7 
                                                 
65 Cooney, S. (2006). China’s impact on the US automotive industry 
 39 
 
39
Chery 6 
Nissan 5 
PSA 5 
Geely 5 
Mazda 4 
Suzuki 4 
Toyota 4 
Others 17 
 
 
4.1.2 Export potential and challenges 
 
It is easy to estimate that eventually Chinese vehicle manufacturers will be able to 
compete internationally and export vehicles to the more mature and demanding markets 
of the West and Japan. However, it is not as easy to estimate the time it will happen. 
Thus, the crucial question to be answered is when and under what circumstances will the 
Chinese be ready to export big numbers of vehicles. It is clear that they are now not in the 
position to become significantly big, in a global sense, since they lack quality, safety, 
technological and managerial skills and their brands are not strong enough to survive the 
competition that they will have to face when they start exporting their vehicles to mature 
markets such as Europe and the US.  
 
Apart from their individual disadvantages there are other problems concerning the 
Chinese automotive industry as a whole, such as the overcapacity of the industry, the 
huge number of manufacturers and despite what most people think the high costs that the 
industry is facing. One should not forget that in China the companies provide housing, 
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health and educational services for the workers and their families,66 something that in 
combination with the fact that many key components have to be imported due to the 
lower quality of the ones manufactured in China creates additional costs that would have 
to be reduced in order to become competitive in exporting vehicles.  
 
Something vitally important for the industry is to rationalize so that the companies 
become bigger and more competitive and lower their costs through economies of scale. 
The number of the vehicle manufacturers in the country is almost 120 and very few of 
them actually have production of over 100 thousand vehicles in order to sustain efficient 
production and provide them with the potential of becoming serious players in the 
market. However, due to the help they receive from local governments this situation does 
not seem to be changing, maintaining a serious problem that the industry has been facing.  
The Chinese central government has been trying to promote a rationalization policy in 
order to create the so called “Big Three”, as it tried to do in the mid 1990s without 
success,67 SAIC, Dongfeng and FAW and lower the number of the big vehicle 
manufacturers in the country from 14 to 10.68 However, the plan has been hampered by 
the local governments’ unwillingness to let go of smaller, inefficient manufacturers in 
order to save jobs and gain political power. Many local banks are helping the local 
vehicle manufacturers to find finance and local governments are supporting them in their 
quest to form alliances with global manufacturers, something that causes problems since 
in many cases they seriously lack understanding of the industry. Indeed, some 
rationalization has already happened through some acquisitions of smaller manufacturers 
by the bigger ones, such as SAIC purchase of Chery’s 25 percent or the acquisition of 
 
66 Thun E, (2006). Changing Lanes in China: Foreign Direct Investment, Local Governments and Auto 
Sector Development. CUP. Cambridge 
67 As mentioned in Part II of the paper 
68 China.org.cn. SAIC and FAW may be prompted to buy rival. 26/2/2009. 
http://china.org.cn/business/2009-02/26/content_17337705.htm 
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Nanjing’s automotive assets, but this seems to be mainly driven by the individual firms’ 
activity rather than efficient central government planning.69 
 
A very serious problem that has to be addressed if the Chinese cars are to be exported in 
the West is the safety issues the Chinese cars are facing. The Chinese safety levels are 
significantly lower than the ones provided by the Western and Japanese companies and 
even though there have been improvements in that field they are still behind. The 
Brilliance BS6 and the Jiangling Motors Landwind model ASAC crash test failures70 
have created a negative momentum, not just for the companies’ reputation, but for 
Chinese cars in general and have showed that even a respectable Chinese company like 
Brilliance still needed a lot of work to reach acceptable Western safety standards. Even 
though there have been improvements in this field, Chinese vehicle manufacturers still 
lag behind the Western and Japanese ones. In addition, another problem that should be 
solved is the emission levels of the Chinese cars, which are currently in most cases much 
higher than the acceptable ones. For example in 2006 Geely announced that even though 
the company exhibited models at the Detroit Motor Show, the company’s cars’ emissions 
were much higher than the regulations and would need further development to reach the 
acceptable levels.71 
 
In order to quicken the process of acquiring technical and design skills, improve the RnD 
capabilities and improve the overall quality there are four alternative routes to be 
followed:72 
 
1. Acquiring foreign firms or their technologies 
2. Entering into partnerships with foreign firms 
 
69 The New York Times. China turns to forced mergers in its auto industry. 24/2/2009 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/china-turns-to-forced-mergers-in-its-auto-industry/ 
70 Pictures can be found at: http://landwind.bootnetworks.com/ 
71 Autoblog.com. Geely makes history at Detroit Auto show. 10/1/2006 
72 Donnelly, T. (2008). The Chinese Car Industry and Globalization 
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3. Obtaining the services of foreign firms 
4. Working with international 0.5 or tier-one suppliers 
 
The world has already seen mergers and acquisitions that Chinese companies are 
involved and it seems very likely for this trend to continue, since it is a quick way to gain 
access to technologies, skills and networks that the Chinese companies are currently 
lacking. The Nanjing acquisition of the British MG Rover, where former engineers of the 
British company are working in order to improve the company’s facilities and models in 
China, the co-operations of Geely and Chery with European and Australian companies as 
well as the co-operation of Brilliance with the German giant BMW are typical examples 
of what has been going on lately. Chery has purchased high quality equipment for its 
RnD facilities and SAIC has formed a joint venture with Ricardo engineering, a UK 
design and engineering company and in addition has access to a very advanced 
development center due to the joint venture with Volkswagen. In addition, Nanjing 
Automotive plans to spend 250 million dollars on a five year plan in order to kick start 
RnD.73 
 
However, the Chinese companies are still lagging behind in RnD capabilities and it is of 
vital importance for them to gain this ability. Nanjing’s plan on RnD for example might 
be a serious amount of money but it still is a small amount compared to the other 
companies’ investments. In order to have a better understanding of how seriously the 
Western companies are taking research is their investments in that field. In 2007 
Volkswagen announced that it planned to invest 14 billion Euros within the next 3 years 
on new products and plants devoted to the VW brand.74 Of course the sizes are not 
comparable but this is a sign that even bigger RnD investments should be made in the 
 
73 The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2006) Driven: Are China’s Manufacturers Ready to Compete in the 
US and Europe? 
 
74 Edmunds.com. VW Detail Massive Investment in Future Vehicles. 27/10/2007 
http://www.edmunds.com/insideline/do/News/articleId=123736 
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future if the Chinese companies really want to become pioneers. The co-operations with 
these Western and more advanced companies will expose the Chinese to skills they do 
not posses and create a leapfrogging effect but still there needs to be a plan for a more 
national policy in favour of RnD and bigger investments on behalf of the companies 
themselves in order to become true pioneers in the industry. Reverse engineering is after 
a point no longer effective and different strategies need to be followed. 
 
 
4.2 Motivations and expanding efforts 
 
The WTO accession helped the Chinese companies expand and start exporting to the rest 
of the world. Having reached a sufficient level of quality and safety standards that 
allowed them to export to developing countries at first, the Chinese companies have 
already been exporting serious numbers of vehicles. The growth of exports is very 
impressive, even though it is of course at a beginner’s stage. From 1980 to 1998 China 
exported almost 127,000 cars, whereas nearly 173,000 were exported in 2005.75 Even 
more impressively the country reached 680,700 vehicles in 2008 and it is a matter of very 
few years, maybe even months, to reach one million.76 
 
In the Chinese market the domestic manufacturers are facing extreme competition by the 
larger joint ventures and the imported global manufacturers’ cars. The difficulties in 
competing with big international companies in terms of reliability, safety and emissions, 
as well as the opportunities in other developing markets where demand is constantly 
increasing due to the price advantages that they are enjoying have lead domestic 
manufacturers in exporting vehicles abroad. The vast majority of exported Chinese 
 
75 China.org.cn. Review of China’s car industry in past 5 year. 11/12/2006. 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/191884.htm  
76 China Daily. China auto export slows in 2008 amid falling demand. 2/4/2009. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-02/04/content_7446068.htm 
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vehicles is exported to developing countries where low priced and small cars are more 
popular and where they can capitalize on their price advantages; countries such as Russia, 
Vietnam, areas such as Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In addition, the high 
competition in the domestic market, in combination with the increasing demand for cheap 
vehicles in the developing markets have been very important factors of Chinese efforts to 
expand in these markets where it is easier to export cars due to regulations and safety and 
emission standards.77 
 
However, as said before, the key markets that the Chinese companies are aiming at are 
the mature markets of North America and Europe. It is of vital importance for these 
companies to build their brand image and that is something that will happen if they are 
able to export to the West. It is a top priority for Chinese manufacturers to climb up the 
ladder and enter mature markets and become true international brands from just another 
Chinese vehicle manufacturer. It is very important for their image to sell cars in many 
countries, and especially to European and American markets, something that will allow 
them to be more competitive in the domestic Chinese market as well since they will no 
longer be treated as cheap car manufacturers but as true global players. In addition, being 
able to export to these markets will be a proof that these brands will have moved up the 
next level as well as a practical result of their ability to build good and technologically 
advanced cars, since the stricter regulations in the Western markets leave no other choice. 
Being able to meet the much stricter requirements, rules and regulations and passing the 
quality, safety and environmental tests will show the world that they have achieved much 
higher standards and that they have reached their international competitors’ quality 
levels. 
 
However, the steps they are making are cautious, especially after Brilliance, the only 
Chinese company that has so far established presence in the European market, failed to 
 
77 Seekingalpha.com. Chinese companies go abroad. 5/1/2009. http://seekingalpha.com/article/113207-
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get more than just one star at the Euro NCAP safety tests.78 Even though the company 
came back with a better, improved version of the same model just a few months later and 
got 3 stars, the video that was uploaded on YouTube damaged the brand’s prestige, even 
before it started selling cars to the European market. Consequently, the Chinese 
manufacturers are taking very cautious steps in expanding to these markets. The means 
on this expansion are partnerships with certain companies, in order to use their better 
knowledge on some fields as well as their market channels and in some cases Mergers 
and Acquisitions (MA), such as the MG acquisition by Nanjing Auto Group, taking 
advantage of their financial capabilities and the current economic crisis. Access to the 
partners’ factories is very important for them since they get access to more advanced 
facilities and know how and in addition it gives them the ability to provide competitive 
after sales support to their customers, a very important factor considered by buyers 
everywhere. 
 
Chery has already constructed eight factories abroad,79 all in developing countries such 
as Russia, Ukraine, Iran, Thailand and Uruguay and has been building cars for these areas 
giving the company the ability to be closer to the local markets and provide better after 
sales support, something crucially important for the success of the company’s export 
plans for further expansion into the American and European markets.  
 
Chery is the biggest Chinese vehicle exporter, reaching auto exports of 135 thousand cars 
in 2008.80 The company was established in 1997 in the Chinese province Anhui and now 
has the capacity of 650 thousand cars and engines and 400 thousand sets of 
transmissions, employing 25 thousand people and having a very big RnD department, for 
 
chinese-companies-go-abroad-part-1-the-auto-sector 
78 Video url: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzoRdDssL1w 
79 http://www.cheryinternational.com/ 
80 Autonews.gasgoo.com. Chery still leads China auto exporters in 2008. 13/7/2009, 
http://autonews.gasgoo.com/auto-news/1011074/Chery-still-leads-China-auto-exporters-in-2008.html 
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Chinese standards.81 The main motto of the company’s export plans is “first developing 
countries, then the developed ones”. So far the company has been exporting to more than 
70 developing countries, virtually everywhere in the world apart from North America and 
Western Europe, taking advantage of the less strict emission and safety standards, as well 
as the importance of the price factor in these markets. However, the main target, and the 
one that will be able to boost the company’s sales and level is of course the developed 
and mature markets of the developed world. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are ways that the Chinese are using in order to gain access to 
these markets taking advantage of their good financial condition, the cash they have and 
the strong support of the government concerning exports.82 Chery for example has 
recently got a 1.5 billion dollar loan from China Exim for the company’s overseas 
expansion plans and the rumours for the company’s acquisition of currently facing 
bankruptcy GM-owned Volvo are getting more and more intense the time this paper is 
being written.  There are serious doubts about the company’s ability to acquire such a big 
brand as Volvo since it is a very big brand, much bigger than itself and it seems quite 
unlikely for the Chinese company to acquire a brand that its value is estimated to more 
than 5 billion dollars.83 In addition, there is serious doubt on whether the Chinese would 
have the managerial and marketing abilities to control and make use of such a big brand. 
Nonetheless, the interest that Chinese companies have been expressing lately in acquiring 
western companies, even though sometimes it seems that they are too big for them to 
handle, is a proof of how serious they are about it and that they have money to spend in a 
period that everyone is trying to cut costs and sell assets. 
 
 
81 http://www.cheryinternational.com/ 
82 Huliq news. External Internal MnAs to Fuel China’s Auto Industry. 21/11/2008. 
http://www.huliq.com/3169/73305/external-internal-m-fuel-chinas-auto-industry 
 
83 Autonews.gasgoo.com. Chery auto gets green light to buy Volvo car brand. 6/3/2009 
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Forming alliances with western companies is another typical practise for Chinese 
companies since it provides access to advanced facilities and knowledge. A very 
important goal for these companies is the improvement of managerial and technical 
skills, as well as their design abilities which are considered almost equally important to 
quality, especially in mature markets. Qi Yumin, the chairman of Brilliance Automotive 
himself has stated that the most important goal of Brilliance is to improve the company’s 
design and brand management capabilities.84 Geely, the second largest domestic 
automaker in China and an export pioneer, has acquired an Italian Design brand in order 
to improve the company cars’ designs and an RnD center in Japan to improve the 
company’s technological capabilities and in addition it has been cooperating with 
Mitsubishi in their efforts in creating competitive engines for the company’s models.85 
What is more, the company has founded colleges in Beijing, Zhejiang, and Hainan where 
thousands of students study each year gradually forming a tank of talented, young 
engineers that will eventually work for the automotive industry. Geely is actually the only 
automaker that has not had any kind of help from the government so far, something that 
according to Mr. Li Shufu, the company’s chairman, has been the most important factor 
of the company’s competitiveness since many of the companies that enjoyed state help 
had far less incentives to become productive and competitive. Geely’s main advantage is 
the low costs that it faces during production, mainly due to the low average age of its 
employees, meaning much lower salaries and health benefits, as well as its location to the 
north-east part of China, where the costs are much lower than the ones the international 
companies face in Shanghai or Beijing. In 2007, the company formed a joint venture with 
a British company to manufacture the famous London taxis in Shanghai and Chery has 
been cooperating with Daimler Chrysler in making cars for the American market.86 
 
 
84 China Daily. Qi shares opinion on China’s auto industry. 13/10/2008 
85 http://www.geely.com/ 
86 Bradsher, K. Too many Chinese cars, too few Chinese buyers. So far. The New York Times. 18/11/2006.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/18/business/worldbusiness/18auto.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5088&en=2b
b01e1df7842c15&ex=1321506000&partne 
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On the other hand it is very interesting to see Brilliance’s efforts since Brilliance is the 
only Chinese automaker which has already introduced its models in Europe apart from 
Russia, South Africa and the Middle East countries. The company from Shengyang 
province has been producing minivans and luxury passenger cars. In order to improve 
quality and technical skills Brilliance signed a cooperation contract with German luxury 
car company BMW in 2003 and since then they have been producing BMW series 3 and 
5 for the Chinese market at the company’s factory in China. Under a technical assistance 
agreement with BMW the German company has been providing engineering consulting 
services to the Chinese technicians.87 The company aims at selling 300 thousand cars in 
China88 and 10 thousand cars in the European market in 2010. It is very important for 
these companies to form an advanced network of dealers, in order to be able to promote 
their vehicles and provide after sales services to its customers and a very important ally is 
the company’s European distributor, Austrian HSO Motor Europe, which has as general 
manager Mr. Hans-Ulrich Sachs, the man who imported very successfully Hyundai cars 
in Europe 20 years ago.89 In addition the company is cooperating with the Japanese 
Toyota and Mitsubishi in its efforts to improve the models’ engines and with the Italian 
design company Italdesign S.P.A., since it is very important to sell cars that have high 
levels of design.90 
 
However, even if the Chinese companies manage to get access to the technology and 
experience they are missing right now the main problem will still exist: the entrance in a 
market that the buyers are very demanding and not particularly willing to buy something 
unknown and where brand reorganization, emissions and quality and safety are very 
important, even more important than price itself. In order to gain significant market share, 
 
87 http://www.brillianceauto.com/main.html 
88 www.theautochanel.com. Brilliance auto aims to sell 300,000 vehicles in ’09. 31/12/2008  
89 Beijing Times. Brilliance motors to have big success in Europe. 3/4/2009 
90 China Daily. Qi shares opinion  of China’s auto industry. 13/10/008 
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the Chinese automakers have been planning in following a similar strategy to the one that 
they have followed in the domestic market against the joint ventures and the Japanese and 
western imports. They will have to use their cost advantages and introduce cheap cars in 
the markets, without cutting down on quality and safety however, since mature markets 
are much more demanding than developing ones. In addition, the Chinese government 
has been pushing companies like Geely, Chery and Brilliance Automotive in order to 
create global brands that will be able to compete in the global environment, following the 
steps of other brands in different industries, such as Lenovo in the computers industry. 
The example of the Japanese and Korean brands in the 1960s and 1970s is something the 
Chinese are aware of and it seems that even though the times are very different there are 
quite a few similarities in these cases. Surprisingly, it seems that the current financial 
crisis is actually an ally rather than a problem for the Chinese companies. 
 
 
4.3 Global crisis: an ally or an enemy? 
 
The current financial crisis has caused serious problems to the global automotive 
industry. All the global players have been facing problems and trying to cut costs, or sell 
brands and assets that are not very profitable, or loss making. Very recently the GM said 
that it was approached by a Chinese company to buy German brand OPEL91 and Swedish 
brand SAAB is currently on sale by General Motors in its efforts to find a solution to the 
serious financial problems it has been facing lately. It is generally believed by most 
economists and organisations that the world economy will start recovering in 2010, thus 
it should be reasonable to expect another year of very low growth rates. Unfortunately for 
the automotive industry it is one of the sectors that are hit harder by the crisis.  
 
 
91 China Daily. 7/7/2009. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-07/08/content_8397225.htm 
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The crisis has unavoidably affected the Chinese economy as well, lowering the growth 
rates at record low levels, something that has consequently had an impact on the local 
automobile industry. However, even though the times are difficult the Chinese, taking 
advantage the better financial condition they have in comparison to their American and 
European competitors, are trying to expand. Nanjing Automotive, a relatively small 
automaker bought the English MG Rover in 2005 after bidding against Shanghai’s SAIC 
as a first step of the company’s long term European plans. For the time being the 
company is producing the Row’ee models for the Chinese market based on the Rover 25 
and 75 models but the main objective of acquiring more advanced facilities, technology 
and technical skills a sales network base in Europe was fulfilled.92 In addition, SAIC 
owns 51 percent of South Korean SUV manufacturer Ssanygong since 2004 when it 
bought its share for almost 500 million dollars. However, these acquisitions do not 
always become profitable. SAIC has been facing serious problems with managing 
Ssangyong93 and there are doubts whether acquiring brands and factories is good enough 
on its own. Chinese companies are reported to have tried to acquire Swedish SAAB and 
Volvo, as well as German Opel from GM and they are on the look for opportunities to 
buy brands and assets in order to accelerate their export plans. Mergers and acquisitions 
are a good way to jump start and move faster but the Chinese companies need to improve 
their RnD and research capabilities if they want to be truly global leaders. It seems that 
many of them are taking it seriously and are gradually increasing their RnD expenditure 
and in addition hiring managers from western companies in order to improve their 
management and quality control problems. 
 
Even though the times are particularly hard for the global industry, an opportunity seems 
to be rising for the Chinese companies; an opportunity that the Japanese and especially 
Toyota and Honda, faced and took advantage of in the 1970s that actually helped them 
introduce their models into the American market. In order to understand the potential the 
 
92 BBC. 23/7/2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4708739.stm 
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Chinese are facing and see similarities in the Chinese path towards the West we should 
first present a brief history of the Japanese “invasion” in the American market that started 
taking place in the 1960s and peaked in the mid 1970s. 
 
4.3.1 The Japanese “invasion” 
 
Toyota’s success in the United States took place in the early 1970s and it was a result of 
significant cost advantages over their American and European (mainly Volkswagen) 
competitors, the very intense domestic competition with NISSAN, as well as the two oil 
crises that the world faced during that decade. Toyota had been working on Toyopet, a 
small economic car aiming at low and middle class car buyers trying to take advantage of 
the niche in a market that big cars were dominant, since 1947.  In 1957 the company 
introduced the model in the American market but failed to create a positive image since it 
performed poorly in the tests in the States and sales were very poor. However, the 
company did not give up and despite the bad reputation it had among the very demanding 
and used to driving big cars American customers decided to create a model that would be 
focused on the American market and overcome the problems it faced in their first effort 
with Toyopet. In order to overcome the problems they had been facing and get rid of the 
bad reputation, concerning mainly quality and safety issues Japanese cars had in the US, 
they hired consultants from American companies who managed to introduce techniques 
that improved their cars’ quality to a great extent. The result of their RnD efforts created 
the Corona model, a model that aimed towards people who wanted a cheap, small and 
fuel efficient car that differentiated from the big, fast cars the public had been offered by 
the American companies. Toyota managed to take advantage of the market niche that 
existed in the American market and enjoyed the advantage of being the company that first 
introduced such cars in the market, even though these cars were not popular at all these 
days. In addition, the Toyota Production System and the advanced logistics abilities 
 
93 Autoparts007.com. 27/3/2009. http://news.autoparts007.com/en/show/2009327/1356.html 
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created the opportunities to reach economies of scale and made the Japanese cars’ 
production cost much cheaper that their American adversaries. The weak Japanese yen at 
the time played a significantly important role since it made Japanese cars cheaper than 
the American and German ones, since it was weaker than both dollar and German mark 
leading many dealers to change to Toyota cars and helped create a network of Toyota 
dealers, something very important for the company’s introduction to the market. Just like 
the Chinese case the Japanese companies were heavily protected by the Japanese 
government during their first steps, since the state had decided to protect and support 3 
main companies that would be leaders in the market. We should not forget that the 
Chinese government’s 11th 5 year plan aims at creating 3 big players in the market that 
will be able to compete in the global environment with the American, European and 
Japanese manufacturers. 
 
However, on top of all the above, there was a very important coincidence that played a 
very important role, not so much on whether the Japanese cars would gain access to the 
market though; this was just a matter of time, as it seems to be the case now with the 
Chinese cars. The two oil crises of the 1970s helped the Japanese introduce their cars 
faster than expected since the more oil conscious Japanese companies had already been 
producing cars that were much more fuel efficient than the American ones and when the 
crisis stroke and gasoline became much more expensive they were able to provide the 
market with inexpensive quality cars that consumed much less gasoline than the 
American competition, turning them into leaders in the small car market, a market that 
was going to be a very big one in the years to come. The American’s efforts to provide 
smaller cars more damaged their image than help them increase their market shares since 
they did not have the experience and ability, as well as the time, to develop good quality 
small cars and the end of the second crisis in 1978 found Toyota with a market share of 
25% in the American market, mainly to the company’s ability to provide good quality, 
cheap and fuel efficient cars. 
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The similarities with what the world’s industry has been facing recently are quite a few 
and able to make researchers that the history repeats itself, at least up to a point. Even 
though the markets and the global situation is not the same we can see that this period 
resembles the Toyota case 30 years ago in many ways. The current global crisis provides 
the opportunity for the Chinese manufacturers to emerge as new key players in the global 
automobile market since they are in a position to provide cheap cars to many markets. 
Whether they will actually be successful will be determined by their ability to improve 
safety, quality and environmental standards. Just like the Japanese 30 years ago they have 
the strong support of their governments with legislation that protects them and low 
interest government loans, like the cases of BYD or Geely, and in addition the advantage 
of the exposure to new management and production techniques through the joint ventures 
most Chinese manufacturers have set with Western and Japanese giants in China. In 
addition, the extreme competition that the Chinese market provides is a good pull force 
for them to improve, especially since the WTO accession and the imports of better, cheap 
Western cars in the domestic market. As mentioned in the second part of the paper, the 
WTO had a very catalytic role in the evolution of the Chinese companies since it 
provided all the conditions the market needed to become truly competitive, something 
that helped the Chinese companies improve. Last but not least the country’s, as well as 
the companies’ fortune to have cash in such a serious crisis is a very important factor that 
one should never forget. The Chinese now have the ability to pursue much more 
aggressive strategies and instead of trying to create an attractive brand image for the 
Western markets they can “buy their way in”, taking advantage of the financial 
difficulties many automotive companies are facing all around the world.  
 
However, there are some serious differences between the two cases. First of all there does 
not seem to be such a big market niche similar to the small car one in the early 1970s. It 
could be claimed that the environmentally friendly cars are the future of the automotive 
industry but since the Chinese companies are lagging behind and have not the same RnD 
capabilities indicates that this is a niche that they will not be able to take advantage of; at 
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least in the short term future. It is very important for the Chinese companies to improve 
their RnD capabilities since that is the only way to become true pioneers in the 
technological sector. In addition, the competition is much harder now that there are many 
companies that have reached a certain quality level and the markets are now totally 
different than 30 years ago.  
 
However, the industry will at some point recover from the crisis and they will need to be 
ready when it does. The competition is very strong in our era, much more extreme than 
the one the Japanese and Koreans faced some decades ago and in combination with the 
Chinese government’s inability to support the industry as much as the Japanese, Korean 
and even the Chinese ones did in the past it is of vital importance to improve their RnD 
capabilities and create a strong and indigenous industry with strong brand names that will 
be able to compete in this global environment. The mergers and acquisitions that some 
companies have been using as a tool to gain access to technical and management skills as 
well as sales and after sales networks is a good way of reducing the time that they would 
need in order to become more competitive but improving their RnD capabilities and 
becoming pioneers in technological matters will be the most effective way of forming 
strong brand names, which is the long term goal and a guarantee that the sales will reach 
their global competitors’ levels after all. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 
The Chinese automotive industry is a story of rapid growth and huge potential. From the 
almost non-existent state of the pre reform era to the biggest vehicle manufacturer era in 
terms of production levels in 2009, only 30 years after the beginning of the reforms is 
something that could impress everyone. The WTO accession in 2001 managed to create 
the conditions that would improve the domestic manufacturers, contrary to many people’s 
fears that it would cause serious trouble to the domestic automobile industry. The 
production capabilities increased tremendously and the domestic market has become a 
“war field” with cut-throat competition but potential that the world has never seen before. 
The potential of 50 million cars in the not very distant future is something that cannot be 
ignored by anyone; especially the global automotive giants from the USA, Europe, and 
Japan and of course the constantly growing domestic manufacturers. However, a very 
important step for the Chinese manufacturers is to be able to export abroad, and 
especially in the developed and mature markets of the Western world. By doing so they 
will gain the status of truly international brands and will create strong brand names that 
will allow them to boost their sales, not only abroad but in the domestic market as well.  
 
Following the example of the Japanese and Koreans a few decades earlier they are now 
trying to enter the European and US markets having the unexpected help of a crisis, just 
like their Japanese counterparts thirty years ago, which in combination to a booming 
domestic market and their financial capabilities makes them in a powerful position. The 
Chinese companies, especially the domestic ones now have an opportunity to make a 
serious entry in the Western markets and it seems that it is a matter of a few years for 
them to become big global players. What most people had been expecting to happen 
seems to be very likely to become reality much sooner than most researchers would 
actually expect. It is very important for the Chinese to do what the Japanese and Koreans 
did in the past even though the times and the markets are very different and the strategies 
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to be followed should be different as well. They should take advantage of the 
opportunities they are and will be facing in the future in order to improve their brand 
image, their technological and managerial skills and improve their RnD capabilities to a 
serious extent. Taken into consideration of the abilities that the Chinese companies have 
been presenting all these years, the momentum of the economy as a whole and the great 
support from the central government it seems that it will take them less time to become 
big in a global scale than their Asian neighbors. Perhaps an estimation of having exports 
in competitive to the global giants’ numbers and competition in the more advanced and 
mature markets of the US and Europe from Chinese vehicle manufacturers in the next 10 
years would not be extremely optimistic; on the contrary. It took the Japanese 30 years to 
become big in a global sense and it seems that the Chinese will make it much quicker. In 
order to do that however, there are many things that they will have to improve. The 
domestic industry will have to rationalize in order to move to the next step, even though 
this might cause some social problems at first. The time of reverse engineering is coming 
to an end, now the Chinese manufacturers must start creating on their own and they seem 
to be on the right track. 
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